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## **Speech at the 39<sup>th</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy**

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Ladies and gentlemen,

When this conference assembled a year ago, it was still in the grip of the shock waves that followed September 11. The United States headed a worldwide alliance against terrorism. The threat, at that time, was clear to all of us. The unity and resolve of the international community were strong and visible.

And what of the situation now, one year on? For many people, the threat seems to have lost its sharp contours. The unity and resolve of September 11 are beset by serious doubts and tensions. The Iraq crisis is inflaming passions and sowing division. The first question is this: can or must the Iraq crisis be seen in the context of the fight against terrorism? Secondly, can certain types of response be excluded from the outset? As Europe struggles to find an answer to these questions, its ability to act is at stake. The transatlantic partnership is being more severely tested than at any time since the debate on INF modernization in the early eighties of the last century.

Let me say that this is not the day to present the situation in an unduly favourable light. We must look reality in the eye in order to recognize and eliminate the danger, for the controversy about the right course to adopt in the Iraq conflict actually concerns the core principles around which our security policy has hitherto been. It is a matter of finding the correct response to two fundamental changes that the international security situation has undergone since the end of the Cold War.

Firstly, in the place of a global but calculable conflict between two superpowers and two blueprints for society there are now a host of diverse and highly unpredictable trouble spots and one single superpower. Europe is seeking its role in this world.

Secondly, the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as state-sponsored terrorism have considerably changed the character of prevention and defence. This is the greatest transformation in the nature of the threat since the invention of the atom bomb more than half a century ago. In this world the European mind is seeking new standards governing permissible means of countering such threats.

As they engage in this quest, the Europeans see a United States which is evidently better prepared for these new dangers. Europe, by contrast, and Germany in particular, are struggling to come to terms with this new situation. As yet, our instinct and self-perception still drive us to find joint responses. At the same time we must make an objective appraisal of our European interests and capabilities.

Which paths are open to Europe as it tries to guarantee its own security while exercising responsibility for international peace? Which strategy can truly stand the test, even in such dangerous and complex crises as the Iraq conflict?

By way of an experiment, let us imagine that Europe acquired an independent, comprehensive security system covering every possible threat scenario. Europe's fate would largely be in its own hands - for better or for worse.

In practice, if the Europeans were to have an effective comprehensive security system, they would need a common institution with full authority to exercise political leadership, particularly in times of crisis. The existence of such a security system would also imply a unanimously accepted definition of Europe's security interests - in geographical, in economic and in military terms. Lastly, it would require strong, operational instruments for its protection, in other words the full gamut of modern armed forces, reconnaissance systems and diplomacy.

Unfortunately, it is not difficult to recognize that Europe is still decades away from fulfilling these three requirements - the institution, the will and the capacity. Developments of recent weeks have made this clear, even to the greatest optimists. I certainly do not wish to underestimate the efforts of the EU in the context of the common security and defence policy or its striving for stronger institutions in the field of foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is not disputed in any of the European capitals that Europe must do more for international security. It has become equally clear, however, that the European Union can neither aspire to the status of a global player in the security arena in theory nor act as one in practice at any time in the foreseeable future. Europe is already hard pressed to perform its present tasks.

If, however, Europe will not and cannot guarantee its security single-handedly, the only responsible alternative is entry into a security alliance. This, too, has far-reaching consequences. First of all, our security partner must be carefully chosen. The only potential partner is the one whose interests most closely match our own, whose society best reflects our fundamental values. For all the differences that may exist between us, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the United States of America, together with Canada, meets these criteria. No other country in the world is even half as suitable.

Western Europe has belonged to a security alliance, namely NATO, since 1948. However, until the end of the Cold War, NATO was not actually a system of mutual security in practice. Rather, the Europeans were almost exclusively importers of security, the United States being the exporter. And the Germans, for their part, were the main beneficiaries of the whole system.

Much has been said and written about the fact that, by invoking its Article 5 commitment in favour of the United States after September 11, NATO activated, for the first time, the reciprocity of the North Atlantic Treaty, which had been a purely theoretical concept until then. This in turn has compelled Germany to seek more actively to redefine its role in Europe and in the world.

I mention this in order to highlight another consequence of the new era that began after 1989 and after September 11: anyone who agrees to join a security partnership is no

longer at liberty to define common security in isolation. This does not mean that no agreements can be reached within an alliance on areas of joint responsibility and areas in which one party assumes primary responsibility. Defence against the many-faceted dangers of international terrorism, however - particularly in combination with weapons of mass destruction - cannot be divided into separate areas of responsibility, either in a geographical or political sense or in technical and practical terms. It is an integral part of the whole alliance.

Whether we like it or not, when an ally is threatened, that is our business too. The threat to our ally, the United States, became evident on September 11, if not before. It is real, not imaginary. The threat from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction is also real, not imaginary. The danger they pose can affect all of us.

In this situation, the transatlantic security partnership can only work if the allies agree to a fair and judicious division of labour. Judicious means that not everyone need be able to do everything. Instead, every ally should contribute its special abilities. Fair means that the unpleasant tasks are not left to one party alone. These principles are generally recognized, but in these past few months it has been apparent that there is still a long way to go from recognition to practical application.

Let me refer to two points that seem to be at the heart of this issue. First of all, it worries me that the Europeans lag so far behind in terms of reconnaissance systems and information technology. The Pentagon spends about four times as much on research and development as all Europeans put together (about \$40 bn to \$10 bn), which means that U.S. expenditure on R&D is almost twice as high as the entire German defence budget (about \$40 bn to \$24 bn). We acknowledge that we are about ten years behind the United States. That is an immense gulf. The Europeans know far too little of the dangers that are brewing in the trouble spots of the world. On September 11 at the latest, however, it became crystal-clear that prior knowledge saves lives.

My second point relates to the familiar catchphrase about the international division of labour: "The U.S. fights, the UN feeds, and the EU funds". We Europeans should make every effort to ensure that it does not come to that. It would neither entitle Europe to claim a significant say in world affairs, nor would it make the Americans any more willing to listen to us. Such a division of labour would severely undermine our European sense of identity. Conversely, however, its rejection implies that Europe must be prepared to take part in military operations as a last resort. Sharing in the decision-making process entails sharing the risks.

A judicious and fair division of labour is imperative, not only in the context of transatlantic relations but also within Europe. A year ago, I spoke at length on the serious errors that had been made in dealings with the Federal Armed Forces. I do not intend to analyse these in detail, for I regret to say that I should have to repeat every point I made. Not a single one of those shortcomings has been rectified.

The crucial point, in any case, is the same: the German Federal Government refuses to draw the political conclusions from its signature of the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative in Washington in 1999, of the European Union's European Headline Goal, adopted in the ESDP framework in Helsinki in 1999, or of NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment of 2002. It is not addressing the people to enlist their support for the

allocation of more resources to external security. The most populous and economically strongest country is making the smallest contribution. Germany has now slipped to the foot of the European league, if we disregard Iceland and Luxembourg. There is no conceivable scenario in which the European and the transatlantic security alliance can survive this situation unscathed in the longer term.

Against this background, how do I see Germany's interests and Germany's responsibilities in general and with regard to the current Iraq conflict in particular?

Firstly, at the Prague summit all the members of NATO declared their support for UN Resolution 1441 against Iraq - without reservations or accompanying notes or anything of the sort. The Resolution announces to Saddam Hussein that, if he continues to conceal his weapons of mass destruction, he will have to reckon with military enforcement measures as a last resort. Only as long as this threat remains credible is there any hope that Saddam Hussein will relent before it is too late. Whoever signs Resolution 1441 and then proclaims that the threat must not be enforced is encouraging the dictator and is ultimately doing nothing to safeguard peace but only increasing the probability of war. That policy is irresponsible and is not in the interests of Germany.

Secondly, I welcome every political project that keeps the United States on the path of multilateralism. Even the greatest superpower will ultimately be dependent on reliable partners and binding international rules.

No country advocating the multilateral approach can do as Germany did and be the first to refuse to pursue that approach. The accusation of maverick behaviour applies to the accuser. A government that sets its course without consultation, dismissing as ultimately irrelevant the position adopted by all other states, and hence its European partners too, offends against European unity. But European unification and the rejection of any type of go-it-alone approach is the very *raison d'être* of the democratic Germany that emerged from the cataclysm of the Second World War.

Whoever criticizes the letter from the eight heads of government should distinguish carefully between cause and effect. Let me state this unequivocally for the CDU: if we had been in government, Germany would have signed that letter. And let me add this: if government policy had been true to the tradition nurtured by Helmut Kohl, the present situation would never have arisen in the first place.

Thirdly, anyone who categorically rules out military enforcement measures against Iraq and tries to steer the course of events in that direction must also be prepared to accept responsibility if his policy of purely political containment goes wrong. It is obvious to me that the radical critics of the American approach in the Iraq conflict are unable to shoulder full responsibility for the possible consequences of their deeds and omissions. I will be blunt: to my mind, this cannot be a responsible policy.

In the view of the CDU and CSU in Germany, the United Nations is the place where decisions are taken. We unreservedly support the path upon which the UN Security Council set out when it adopted Resolution 1441. We are aware that the threat posed to world peace by Saddam Hussein has not yet been removed, in spite of the inspections. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made that point convincingly in the UN Security Council on Wednesday. We consider it essential that the United States and its allies take every

opportunity to disarm Saddam Hussein by peaceful means.

If, however, peaceful disarmament proves impossible, and the only option left is to carry out the threat of enforcement, we support military action for the sake of international security and the authority of the UN Charter. In that case, Germany should contribute as its resources permit in coordination with its European and transatlantic allies. This means that the NBC reconnaissance vehicles in Kuwait would most certainly protect the U.S. troops there, and Turkey would receive the protection it requested from AWACS aircraft and Patriot surface-to-air missiles.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are all aware that, in the Iraq crisis, every option carries great risks. It is a very, very difficult balancing act. No one should impute recklessness to anyone else. Peace is a paramount value. But it would be absolutely wrong to trade a future peace, built on secure foundations, for today's illusory and deceptive peace. For this reason, in the coming years, all of us will be confronted by the task of finding and making the appropriate response to the new threats of our age with structures of international law.

Let me close with a personal remark on German-American relations. I believe that close partnership and friendship with the United States of America is just as fundamental a part of Germany's political *raison d'être* as European integration. The party I lead has not forgotten that our country owes its freedom, peace and unity in great measure to the commitment and trust shown by the United States to democratic Germany.

Let me also say, however, that gratitude has been presented for too long as the sole basis of Germany's partnership with the United States. Gratitude is an important factor, but it is not the only one. Today it is also a matter of defining our own interests. This definition, in my view, can only take place on a basis of mutual trust. This was rightly emphasized by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, entitled "Building Trust".

Trust and the definition of our own interests - both of these things are important to me, especially when I think of the young generation, whose only knowledge of the horrors of the Second World War comes from the pages of their history books. And both are especially important to me when I consider the young people of East Germany, to whom the opportunity to discover and experience personally this friendship with the United States has only been available for little more than a decade.

Ladies and gentlemen, I firmly believe that this is the spirit in which the next coordinated steps must be taken towards the resolution of the Iraq conflict. And I am also convinced that the transatlantic partnership can be shaped in that same spirit for the benefit of our peoples. There is no responsible alternative to this approach.

Thank you.