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**Guiding principles for a German and European  
Foreign and Security policy**

**The Common European Policy on Security and Defence (CESDP) must enhance Europe's capacity to take military action at an international level.**

**The Europeans must, however, pay serious attention to the reservations of the USA and to Turkish concerns:**

- The CESDP follows on from previous projects which Europe has realised during the last two decades: the Franco-German corps, the German-Polish-Danish corps, Eurocorps and the overall development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

- Unnecessary duplications must be avoided:

The close links between EU and NATO must be anchored in a "permanent arrangement". This requires close political coordination with regular consultations at foreign minister and ambassador levels. In addition, the EU must have recourse to NATO's planning capacities and command structures. Armed forces planning by NATO and the EU must be harmonised.

Within the CESDP framework, the EU must expand civilian components (police units, technical personnel) , thus developing capabilities which complement those of NATO.

- Any weakening of the transatlantic partnership must be avoided:

The EU must become a more relevant and more equal partner for the USA by building up crisis reaction forces: the CESDP must be implemented in such a way as to contribute to fair burden-sharing and strengthen NATO as a whole.

The American presence in Europe will remain vital in the future. The CDU of Germany calls on the Federal Government to set out a clear position on this issue . The EU should only take action in cases where NATO as a whole does not wish to act – as provided for in NATO’s “Strategic Concept” of April 1999.

- The question of participation in the CESDP by non-EU countries - in particular Turkey and Norway - must be clarified:

As former associate members of the WEU, countries like Turkey and Norway are suffering a tangible (and unnecessary!) loss of status as a result of the de facto absorption of the WEU into the EU/CESDP. The EU should respond positively to Turkey’s desire to be integrated into the CESDP’s decision-making processes; in other words, Turkey should be granted CESDP “associate member” status. In any case, most of the likely CESDP deployment scenarios lie in geographical proximity to Turkey, so it would probably be necessary to use Turkish supply lines. Turkey’s status as a longstanding and reliable Alliance partner should be acknowledged in this context.

Reductions in defence budgets raise doubts about the credibility of the CESDP:

The German decision to procure seventy-five A 400 M transport aircraft has so far not been matched by appropriate provisions in the budget. Similarly, the funding for the German-French-Italian reconnaissance satellite agreed on in June 2000 is still not secure. Further efforts are required in the strategic communications field and with regard to the modernisation of weaponry.

The potential for synergies among the Europeans must be exploited: Germany, Norway and the Netherlands could, for example, consider merging their submarine fleets. The recent establishment of a European defence corporation, EADS, opens up new opportunities for cost savings. These would, however, require coordinated armed forces planning.

A genuine European Security and Defence Policy will require the Europeans to coordinate their defence budgets, in order to identify the financial resources needed to fulfil joint European tasks and create the required capabilities and to determine the national contributions necessary for this purpose. There must be close collaboration on this within the framework of the European bodies. Active support must also be given to the extension of OCCAR into a European armaments agency.

- Clarification is required as to the type of deployment scenario for which crisis response forces are intended, on what basis on and under which conditions they should be deployed and the extent to which consensus achieved amongst the European Member States could be sufficient in specific circumstances. This also applies to the question as to whether there is a right to “humanitarian intervention”. The European Union must reach agreement on the principles and legal basis for such intervention.

**The correct response to globalisation is rapid, but realistic EU enlargement towards the east.**

- Enlarging to take in the Central and Eastern European states and their growth markets will enable the European Union, as by far the largest single market in the Western world, to better assert its interests on the global markets and increase its weight and influence in the world and in the international organisations such as the UN and the WTO, thus allowing it to act more effectively as a force for order and stability. At the same time, the extension of the EU judicial area will improve the chances of dealing more successfully with global challenges - in particular as regards combating international crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and environmental risks. A larger and stronger EU will also strengthen the transatlantic partnership
- The EU must enlarge in such a way as to allow it to deepen further at a later point in time. This requires distinctions to be drawn within the group of accession countries. The CDU is thus in favour of the completion by the end of 2002 of accession negotiations with those countries who by then meet the agreed political, economic and legal criteria for membership, in order that they can participate in the next European Parliament elections in 2004 if possible. We actively support rapid enlargement. Even after the Treaty concluded in Nice, reform must be continued with the aim of a further deepening of the European Union. Negotiations with those countries not able to meet the requirements for accession by the end of 2002 must be continued with increased intensity. The reunification of Europe via eastward enlargement was from the very beginning a CDU project. Germany must regain the locomotive function which it had regarding enlargement when the CDU was in government.
- The challenges posed by eastward enlargement can be managed. Transitional arrangements must be introduced in certain areas because of the very different situations

in the present and future Member States, but they must remain the exception, be applied in a flexible and case-specific manner and be subject to time limits and restrictions on scope; a shortening of the transitional periods must be possible. The special situation of border regions must be taken into account and targeted support provided in particular for improvements to the infrastructure and for small and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, the current EU financial framework must be improved within the context of the interim assessment of Agenda 2000 which is to take place in 2002, as insufficient resources are allocated in this framework for eastward enlargement, in particular for agricultural policy; but the current financial ceiling of 1.27% of EU-GDP which currently applies must not be raised.

- The European Union should carry out its geographical enlargement in line with common values and historical experiences. The fundamental requirement is for the EU to be able to take in new members, whilst maintaining the momentum of European integration: the EU must retain its ability to make decisions, take action and safeguard its interests, and the financial burden created by enlargement must remain manageable; the EU's capacity for integration and the citizens' willingness to accept change must not be placed under an excessive strain. It will not be possible to grant full membership to every country in Europe which seeks a European perspective. Some states could, however, be offered staggered integration by means of closer ties with the EU in individual policy areas such as common foreign, security and defence policy for example, or transport or energy policy – or via association arrangements or the creation of a new European economic area, closely linked with the EU and its single market.

We back all efforts to support Turkey in its European orientation and bind it more closely to the EU economically, politically and institutionally. Also for this reason the EU should

take into account Turkey's desire to be integrated into the CESDP's decision-making processes, especially as the majority of potential deployment scenarios lie in geographical proximity to Turkey. The granting of EU accession candidate status was, however, at the least premature and threatens to lead to disappointment for Turkey and to further alienation between Turkey and Europe if the high expectations linked with this status are not met as quickly as Turkey had hoped.

In order to achieve a Europe without dividing lines we want to create a relationship of partnership with Russia which reflects its size, its position in Europe and its self-perception. For this reason, we support all efforts to create the conditions necessary to allow the EU's relations to Russia to be deepened beyond the scope of the Partnership Agreement within the framework of a free trade zone.

We have an interest in an independent, strong Ukraine, orientated towards the EU. For this reason Ukraine should, once the Partnership Agreement with the EU has been successful, be offered the perspective of closer cooperation in the context of the common foreign, security and defence policy and, beyond the scope of the planned free trade agreement, of membership in a new European economic area.

**A decision should be taken at the NATO summit in the spring of 2002 to open up the Alliance to further candidate countries**

The first round of enlargement, with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic represented a major stability gain for Europe. Directly after their accession, during the Kosovo war, the new members proved themselves reliable partners in the Alliance. Polish-Russian relations are better today than they were five years ago, as Poland's NATO membership has clarified the situation. NATO has demonstrated , through its ability to enlarge, its role as a vital cornerstone of the European-Atlantic partnership.

After the positive experiences with the first wave of enlargement, NATO enlargement should be continued step by step. In this respect too, Germany must, in its own interests, and contrary to the Federal Government's passive approach, which is already being seen as discouraging in the USA, assume a leading role.

The strategic aim of improving security and stability right across Europe must be the most important criterion for decisions on this issue. Southeast Europe is the only European region with a major potential for crisis and conflict. NATO enlargement can make a particular contribution, beyond the scope of economic cooperation, the Stability Pact and the EU perspective, to the stabilisation of this region.

For this reason, agreement should be reached at the NATO summit in spring 2002 on the accession of Slovenia and Slovakia at the least, but also of Bulgaria and, if possible, Romania:

- Slovenia was already fit for accession at the time of the first round of enlargement in 1997. The political situation in Slovakia has fundamentally improved since then and Slovakia's geographical position means its membership in NATO is of strategic importance.
- A NATO enlarged to include Bulgaria and Romania would create a clear and urgently needed stability boost for the crisis-ridden Balkans, especially bearing in mind that EU accession for these countries is unlikely in the short or medium term. In addition, this would provide the Alliance with an uninterrupted land route linking Western Europe and Turkey/Greece. Romania's shared border with the Ukraine gives it a particular strategic importance. But Romania must make additional efforts to strengthen democracy and market economics if it wants to prepare itself for NATO accession.

Fortunately, the Baltic states do not lie in a crisis region, indeed the whole of the Baltic area is a politically stable region with rapidly growing prosperity. The Baltic states will very soon accede to the European Union, thus becoming integrated into European security and defence policy. Nevertheless, NATO will not accept any "red line" with regard to its policy of opening itself up to new members, especially since the Baltic states have a natural claim to NATO membership. For this reason, they should be given a time frame for later accession at the 2002 NATO summit.

The strengthening of security and stability right across Europe through the further opening up of NATO is not directed against Russia. NATO must stick to its policy of working with Russia to shape European security within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

**The Europeans and the Americans must work together on the creation of a joint missile defence system**

- For years, our security has been based on the mutual readiness and capacity for destruction. This doctrine of deterrence was successful, but it was always also controversial. We now have the opportunity to complement military deterrence and prevention by defence against missile attacks. We therefore have a moral duty to examine the chances of using missile defence to reduce reliance on offensive weapons by creating mutual reliance on defensive weapons, thus allowing comprehensive disarmament, down to a level of a few hundred nuclear systems. Once this was achieved, the purpose of nuclear weapons could be reduced to the sole task of preventing other nuclear powers from using their nuclear weapons.
- Europe should take up President Bush's proposal concerning the development of a comprehensive defence system, going beyond the scope of *National Missile Defense* – NMD -, and become actively involved in the decision-making process by presenting its own initiatives for a European defence component. National Missile Defense – NMD - must become *Allied Missile Defense* - AMD. This must also be open to non-NATO states. By rejecting this whole concept on principle, the Federal Government is wasting an opportunity to influence the opinion-forming process in the USA. This is something which our French partners have recognised: ideas for a sea-based system in the Mediterranean are already being floated in Paris.
- The dialogue on missile defence must be conducted in such a way as to further strengthen NATO's cohesion, to ensure that the West's cooperation with third states, in particular with Russia, is not threatened and avoid creating a new arms momentum in Asia for instance. A more intensive dialogue with Russia, with the aim of modifying or jointly

denouncing the 1972 ABM Treaty, which dates from the Cold War era of bipolar antagonism, is required.

- In addition, preventative measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be pursued vigorously. This includes strengthening of the whole of the non-proliferation regime; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) must finally enter into force.